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ABSTRACT 
Traditional fault tree analysis is not always sufficient when analysing complex systems. To 
overcome the limitations dynamic fault tree (DFT) analysis is suggested in the literature as 
well as different approaches for how to solve DFTs. For added value in fault tree analysis, 
approximate DFT calculations based on a Markovian approach are presented and evaluated 
here. The approximate DFT calculations are performed using standard Monte Carlo 
simulations and do not require simulations of the full Markov models, which simplifies model 
building and in particular calculations. It is shown how to extend the calculations of the 
traditional OR- and AND-gates, so that information is available on the failure probability, the 
failure rate and the mean downtime at all levels in the fault tree. Two additional logic gates 
are presented that make it possible to model a system’s ability to compensate for failures. This 
work was initiated to enable correct analyses of water supply risks. Drinking water systems 
are typically complex with an inherent ability to compensate for failures that is not easily 
modelled using traditional logic gates. The approximate DFT calculations are compared to 
results from simulations of the corresponding Markov models for three water supply 
examples. For the traditional OR- and AND-gates, and one gate modelling compensation, the 
errors in the results are small. For the other gate modelling compensation, the error increases 
with the number of compensating components. The errors are, however, in most cases 
acceptable with respect to uncertainties in input data. The approximate DFT calculations 
improve the capabilities of fault tree analysis of drinking water systems since they provide 
additional and important information and are simple and practically applicable. 
Keywords: dynamic fault tree (DFT), drinking water, risk assessment, Markov model, Monte 
Carlo simulation, uncertainty. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The need of proper risk assessments of drinking water systems is emphasised within the 
drinking water sector. Furthermore, the World Health Organization [1] points out the 
importance of considering the entire supply system, from source to tap. Methods for assessing 
risks to entire drinking water systems are, however, limited and the complexity of the systems 
provides challenges. Lindhe et al. [2, 3] showed how a method based on dynamic fault tree 
(DFT) analysis can be used to model entire drinking water systems in a correct way and 
provide results that support decisions on risk reduction. 
Fault tree analysis is performed to analyse system reliability and it is commonly used in risk 
assessments. A major purpose of a fault tree analysis is to assist in the calculation of the 
failure probability for systems including different subsystems and components. It has, 
however, been concluded by several authors that traditional static fault trees are not able to 
correctly model the dynamic behaviour of fault-tolerant systems including, for example, spare 
components and dynamic redundancy [e.g. 4, 5]. To overcome this limitation, DFTs have 
been developed in which logic gates designed to model the dynamic behaviour are introduced 
[e.g. 4, 6, 7]. Compared to traditional static fault trees the DFTs are more computationally 
demanding and different techniques for solving them have therefore been developed [e.g. 8, 9, 
10]. It should, however, be noted that also techniques used to calculate traditional fault trees 
are associated with limitations [e.g. 11, 12]. 
Traditionally, DTFs have been solved by using Markov models. When the number of events 
in a fault tree increases, the number of states and transition rates in the corresponding Markov 
model increase rapidly and the calculations can become time consuming. To simplify the 
calculations a modularized approach can be used. This means that the fault tree model is 
divided into smaller parts and parts including dynamic gates are solved by transforming them 
into Markov models and static parts are solved using traditional fault tree calculations [5, 13]. 
Other approaches that have been developed to further simplify DFT calculations and/or 
provide additional results are numerical integration techniques [8], Bayesian network 
modelling [14-16] and a Monte Carlo simulation-based approach [6]. The approach presented 
and evaluated in this paper is based on a Markovian approach but approximate DFT 
calculations are used in combination with Monte Carlo simulations. This approach implies 
that generic equations are devised for the logic gates and the calculations are preformed using 
Monte Carlo simulations. 
A dynamic approach to fault tree modelling, where the temporal aspects of system events are 
included in the calculations, provide additional and needed information when analysing water 
supply risks. Norberg et al. [17] and Lindhe et al. [2] described how to extend the calculations 
of the traditional logic gates using a Markovian approach where each basic event is described 
using a failure rate and a mean downtime. The method includes two variants of the common 
type AND-gate that make it possible to consider the ability of drinking water systems to 
compensate for failures. This dynamic approach provides a wider decision support than 
traditional fault trees. It provides an improved capability to take into account compensation 
and makes it possible to calculate not only the failure probabilities, but also the failure rate 
and the mean downtime at all levels in the fault tree. Lindhe et al. [2] further described how to 
combine these results with information on consequences (number of people affected) to 
calculate risk levels. Due to a substantial complexity in performing exact calculations of 
failure probabilities, failure rates and downtimes, an approximate approach using Monte Carlo 
simulation that does not require complete simulations of the DFT was suggested by Norberg 
et al. [17]. Lindhe et al. [2] describe how to apply the approach when modelling water supply 
risks. The logic gates needed to model water supply risks were converted into Markov models 
and generic equations were devised. This facilitates simple model building and Monte Carlo 
3 
simulations make it possible to consider uncertainties in the calculations. Fault tree models of 
drinking water systems easily become extensive. If DFT calculations of such models can be 
performed using standard software and if expert knowledge in Markov processes is not 
required, then such a method becomes very useful. 
The overall aim of this paper was to provide a quality control of the DFT method presented by 
Lindhe et al. [2]. Specific objectives were to present the basis for the approximate DFT 
calculations and evaluate the capability of the calculations in predicting the true probability of 
failure, failure rate and mean downtime of a drinking water system. The evaluation was made 
by comparing the approximate calculations to results from simulations of the complete 
Markov model for three fault tree examples from a public drinking water system. 
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. In Section 2 we recall the concept of failure 
probability. In Section 3 it is shown how to extend the calculations for two basic types of 
logic gates in a fault tree. The argumentation is extended to two auxiliary gates that have been 
found useful when modelling water supply risks. In Sections 4 and 5, three fault tree 
examples from a municipal drinking water system are studied. Finally, in Section 6 the results 
are discussed and the main conclusions are presented. 
 
2. PROBABILITY OF FAILURE IN DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 
Input to fault tree calculations are probabilities P for basic events Fi , where Fi denotes failure 
of subsystem or component i. We here assume, as is often done, that the basic events are 
independent. If for any i, Fi represents the event that subsystem i is down at a particular point 
in time, then P(F) is the probability that the system is down at that particular point in time. 
Note that P(F) also may be referred to as the unavailability. In the stationary case, P(F) as 
well as all P(Fi) does not depend on time. Assuming ergodicity, P(F) can be thought of as the 
ratio between the Mean Downtime (MDT) and the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF), 
   MDT
MTBF
P F   (1) 
Note that MTBF = MTTF + MDT, where MTTF denotes Mean Time To Failure. Thus, the 
probability P(F) is not always sufficiently informative, since two systems with very different 
dynamic behaviour can have the same P(F). In this paper it is showed how the fault tree 
calculations can be extended so that also estimates of MTTF and MDT are calculated at the 
top level as well as at each intermediate level. This of course requires knowledge of MTTFs 
and MDTs for all basic events. Estimates are then recursively calculated at each level of the 
fault tree. These estimates are calculated under the assumption that the input processes are 
independent and Markovian with only two states, up and down. This means that the failure 
rate is assumed to be constant and equal to 1/MTTF. A similar remark applies to the rate at 
which the process recovers from failure. At intermediate levels and at the top, the rates are 
typically not constant. The calculations, however, assume constant input rates and yield 
constant output rates. Thus, there are errors that when propagated to the top level may be 
quite substantial. However, in applications with large parameter uncertainties the main errors 
in the final result are, according to the author’s experiences, often mainly due to the errors in 
the assumed parameter values for the basic events. In such cases, the enlargement of the 
traditional fault tree calculations presented and evaluated in this paper provide a considerable 
and valuable insight into the dynamics of the studied system. 
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3. DYNAMIC FAULT TREES 
The reader is referred to, for example, Rausand and Høyland [18] for a basic introduction to 
fault tree analysis from a risk perspective in reliability analysis. Events in a fault tree are 
combined using logic gates and the two most common ones are the OR- and the AND-gate. 
Starting from the top event the gates are used to describe the causes of each event and they are 
repeatedly applied until a suitable level of detail is obtained. We will refer to a gate with top, 
or output, event F and basic events Fi as a subsystem consisting of components, all of which 
are either up or down at a particular point in time. In this section the mathematical foundation 
is presented for the common type OR- and AND-gates, and two variants of the AND-gate 
introduced in this paper. Thus, it is shown how the equations necessary for performing 
approximate DFT calculations have been devised. State diagrams are presented to graphically 
illustrate what Markov process each logic gate corresponds to. The two variants of the 
common type AND-gate presented here are similar to what in DFT applications often are 
referred to as SPARE-gates [e.g. 10]. 
A subsystem modelled using an OR-gate is up (functioning) as long as every component is up. 
Similarly, a subsystem modelled using an AND-gate is up as long as at least one of its 
components is up. In structural reliability, the OR-gate corresponds to a serial structure, while 
the AND-gate corresponds to a parallel structure. If the basic events are independent (which 
will be assumed throughout), then, for the OR-gate, 
     1 1 i
i
P F P F    (2) 
while for the AND-gate, 
    i
i
P F P F  (3) 
In drinking water applications an OR-gate may be used to model a situation where insufficient 
raw water quality can be caused by either runoff during heavy precipitation or accidental 
contamination. An AND-gate may be used to model that the supply of water from a pump 
station including two pumps, only is interrupted if both pumps fail, i.e. are in down state at 
the same time. 
 
3.1 The OR-gate 
Replace each basic event of the gate by a Markov process having two states, up (1) and down 
(0). Let λi and 1/μi denote the failure rates and the mean downtimes, respectively, for these 
basic Markov processes. Then, Equation (1) implies 
   ii
i i
P F     (4) 
Note that μi corresponds to repair rates. Rausand and Høyland [18] provide an introduction to 
continuous time Markov chains in reliability. In Figure 1 the state diagram of the combined 
Markov process is shown for an OR-gate including two components. Suppose the system is up, 
then the time to the next failure is exponential with rate 
 i
i
   (5) 
The system mean downtime, 1/μ, now follows from (2), (4) and the general fact 
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     
1 P F
P F
P F
 
  
    (6) 
and is given by 
  
ii
i
i i i ii i
    
      
    (7) 
 
 
Figure 1 State diagram of a Markov process representing an OR-gate including two components. The process 
is down, i.e. in failed state, if at least one component is down. 
 
3.2 The AND-gate 
For the AND-gate, we see from (3) and (4) that 
   i
i i i
P F     (8) 
The state diagram of the AND-gate is shown in Figure 2. The mean downtime 1/μ follows 
from 
 i
i
   (9) 
and the failure rate now follows from (6) and is 
  
ii
i
i i i ii i
    
      
    (10) 
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Figure 2 State diagram of a Markov process representing an AND-gate including two components. The 
process is down when all components are down. 
 
3.3 The first variant of the AND-gate 
The state diagram of the first AND-gate variant is shown in Figure 3. The gate can, for 
example, model a drinking water system where interruptions in the supply from the treatment 
plant to the consumers may be compensated for by two service reservoirs in the distribution 
system. The service reservoirs can only compensate for a limited time since only a certain 
amount of water can be stored. Furthermore, sometimes there is no water in the service 
reservoirs due to, for example, a high water demand or maintenance work and they can thus 
fail on demand. The system is up (water is supplied) as long as the main subsystem is up 
(state 1) or down while at the same time the first or second compensating/backup component 
(service reservoir) is up (state 01 and 001); it is down when in state 0; λ1 and 1/μ1 denote the 
failure rate and mean down time of the system, q2 and q3 are the probabilities of failure on 
demand for the compensating components and their uptimes are exponential(λ2) and 
exponential(λ3), respectively. 
When q3 = 1 the state diagram in Figure 3 is reduced to only include one compensating 
component and state 001 is then excluded. In the derivation below, we make the simplifying 
assumption that q3 = 1. The balance equations are 
    
1 1 01 1 0 1
01 1 2 1 1 2
0 1 1 1 2 01 2
1
p p p
p p q
p p q p
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
where p1 and p01 are the stationary probabilities for the system to be in either of its up states, 
and p0 is the probability that the system is in its only down state. Solving for p0 is 
straightforward. Hence, 
   1 2 2 1
1 1 2 1
qP F      
    (11) 
More generally, it can be proved that 
   11
11 1 1
i i
i i
qP F     
    (12) 
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if the main subsystem has several independent backups. The rate at which the system recovers 
from its down state 0 is μ1. Hence 
 1   (13) 
Now λ can be calculated by inserting (12) and (13) in (6). 
 
 
Figure 3 State diagram of a Markov process representing the first AND-gate variant including one main 
component and two compensating/backup components. In states 01 and 001 failure is compensated 
for by the two backup components. The process is down while in state 0. 
 
3.4 The second variant of the AND-gate 
The second variant of the AND-gate can, for example, model the situation where insufficient 
raw water quality is compensated for by extra capacity in the drinking water treatment plant. 
The extra capacity is not always available and the treatment plant may thus fail on demand. 
The treatment plant may also fail during the time it is compensating and recover and start to 
compensate again. The state diagram is shown in Figure 4. The system down states are 0 and 
00; λ1 and 1/μ1 denotes the failure rate and mean downtime for the initiating failure of 
insufficient raw water quality, q2 is the probability of failure on demand for the treatment 
plant whereas its up- and downtimes are independent and exponential(λ2) and exponential 
(μ2), respectively. 
A straightforward analysis of the balance equations yields 
  
1 2
0
1 1
1 2 2
00
1 1 2 1 2
1
qp
q
p

 
 
    
 
   
 
Hence, 
    2 2 1 21
1 1 2 1 2
q
P F
  
    
      (14) 
Note next that 
  1 1 2 01 2
p q p
P F
    (15) 
where p1 and p01 are the stationary probabilities for being in the up states, given by 
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  
1
1
1 1
1 2 1 2
01
1 1 2 1 2
1
p
q
p

 
  
    
 
    
 
For interpretation of (15), note that the numerator equals the frequency ωF of system failures 
and combine with the general fact P(F)μ = ωF. For further details see e.g. Rausand and 
Høyland [18]. Finally, λ follows from (14), (15) and the general formula (6). Note that there is 
an error in the description of the second AND-gate variant by Norberg et al. [17]. 
 
 
Figure 4 State diagram of a Markov processes representing the second AND-gate variant including one 
compensating component. The initiating failure is compensated for in state 01 and the process is 
down while in state 0 or 00. 
 
3.5 Remarks on the dynamic fault tree calculations 
The calculations in a fault tree are performed from bottom to top. The data (i.e. results) at one 
level is used as input to the calculations at the level immediately above. Our approach 
presumes that the input data to one level consist of Markovian failure (up) and repair (down) 
rates. The calculated rates, however, are not necessarily Markovian. Still, the calculations at 
the next level presume that they are. Clearly, this introduces an error making it wrong to 
assume that rates calculated at the top or at any intermediate level are Markovian. 
In other words, denote by λ the calculated rate of failure at the, say, top level. Let T be a 
typical uptime and denote by ρ(t) its failure rate. Then T is not necessarily exponential(λ) and 
it needs not to be true that ρ(t) = λ. However, in many instances λ is a reasonably good 
approximation of ρ(t). Here we assume ρ(t) = λ and we analyse the results to see how this 
affects the results. 
A similar remark applies to the mean downtime 1/μ. Notice, however, that the probability of 
failure P(F) is calculated exactly at each level and that 
  P F     (16) 
by construction always is true. This remark applies of course only to fault trees that only 
include the traditional OR- and AND-gates. 
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4. EXAMPLES 
The need of approximate DFT calculations was identified when risks to a public drinking 
water system were analysed. Subsystems and components in a drinking water system are 
interconnected and failure in one part of the system may be compensated for by other parts of 
the system. Furthermore, it is often easier to characterise failure events using up- and 
downtimes compared to direct estimations of failure probabilities. 
Lindhe et al. [2] used the approximate DFT calculations to analyse the entire drinking water 
system in Gothenburg, Sweden [see also 3, 19]. A schematic description of the raw water 
supply and the two treatment plants in Gothenburg is presented in Figure 5. In addition, the 
system includes an extensive distribution system used to supply the approximately 500,000 
consumers with water. To model the system a fault tree was constructed by means of the four 
logic gates presented in this paper. In total, the fault tree included approximately 120 basic 
events and 100 logic gates. Three parts of the Gothenburg fault tree model are presented here 
and used to analyse and evaluate the approximate DFT calculations. The overall approach and 
the generic structure of the entire fault tree model are also presented shortly. 
 
 
Figure 5 Schematic description of the raw water supply and the two treatment plants included in the drinking 
water system in Gothenburg. 
 
The fault tree of the Gothenburg system was constructed to model situations where no water 
is delivered to the consumer and also situations where water is delivered but does not meet 
water quality standards, i.e. two top events were used. The fault tree was divided into three 
main parts representing the raw water system, the treatment system and the distribution 
system. The reason for this division was to be able to show how much each part of the system 
contributes to the total risk and thus make it possible to identify where in the system measures 
for reducing the risk are needed most. The variants of the common type AND-gate were used 
to properly model the ability to compensate for failure in different parts of the system. In 
addition to calculating the probability of failure and the dynamic behaviour of the system, also 
the risk was calculated. Two different risk levels were determined and expressed in terms of 
Customer Minutes Lost: (i) the number of minutes per year the average consumer is not 
supplied with water; and (ii) the number of minutes per year the average consumer is supplied 
with water not complying with water quality standards. The risk levels were calculated based 
on the probability of failure and the proportion of consumers affected [2]. Historical data as 
well as expert judgements were used to estimate input parameters and uncertainties of the 
estimates. 
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We refer to Lindhe et al. [2] for further description of analysing drinking water systems using 
DFTs. Lindhe et al. [3] and Rosén et al. [19] present how DFTs can be used to evaluate risk-
reduction measures. 
 
4.1 Example 1 
The three fault tree examples used in this paper are presented in Figure 6. The first example 
illustrates how the main water sources in the Gothenburg system can become unavailable, i.e. 
water cannot be supplied to the treatment plant connected to this water source. This may in 
the end cause an interruption in the supply to the consumers. The fault tree includes only 
traditional OR- and AND-gates. The water source becomes unavailable if the raw water quality 
is considered insufficient (events 1.1-1.5) or technical components fail (events 1.6-1.13). 
Insufficient quality can be caused by different events related to, for example, precipitation and 
accidental release of contaminants. As can be seen in the fault tree there are two systems for 
transferring water to the pump station (gate D), which both have to fail to cause an 
interruption in the transfer of water. 
 
4.2 Example 2 
The second fault tree example (Figure 6) describes the situation where raw water of 
insufficient quality is supplied to one of the system’s treatment plants. The insufficient quality 
in this example is caused by measureable parameters, i.e. parameters that are routinely 
analysed by the water utility. Two initiating events were identified: (i) the quality deviation is 
detected but no action is possible or enough to prevent failure (event 2.1); and (ii) the quality 
deviation is not detected (event 2.3). For both failure types it is possible that the quality 
deviation can be managed by the normal operation of the treatment plant (events 2.2 and 2.4) 
and thus a drinking water fulfilling existing quality standards can be produced. The ability of 
the treatment plan to compensate for insufficient raw water quality was modelled using the 
second variant of the AND-gate. Hence, it was considered that when the treatment plant is 
compensating for failure, events may occur that prevent this ability. However, the treatment 
system may recover and start to compensate again before the initiating failures (events 2.1 and 
2.3) are solved. Furthermore, it was considered that the extra capacity to compensate for 
failures may be unavailable when needed. Input data to the two compensating events were 
defined based on information about variations in the treatment plant operation.  
 
4.3 Example 3 
The third fault tree example (Figure 6) models quantity failures that originate from one of the 
two water treatment plants (WTP 1). Failure at WTP 1 can occur due to failure related to the 
raw water inlet (event 3.1), failure of treatment processes (events 3.2-3.4) or extraordinary 
events (event 3.7) such as fire. Failure in any of the three treatment processes was assumed to 
cause a quality deviation which, if it is detected and the water utility decides to stop the 
delivery (events 3.5 and 3.6), causes a supply shortage. For the two latter events only the 
probability of failure was considered, since they are not dynamic events. 
Although failure occurs at WTP 1 the consumers are not affected as long as other parts of the 
system are able to compensate for the failure (events 3.8-3.10). To model the possibility of 
compensation the first variant of the AND-gate was used. It is possible for WTP 1 itself to 
compensate if stored water at the plant is available. The non-affected treatment plant (WTP 2) 
can compensate for failure by means of increased production and drinking water reservoirs. 
Also reservoirs in the distribution system can be used to prevent failure. The first variant of 
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the AND-gate was used because only a certain amount of water can be stored and when this is 
all used, no compensation is possible and the ability cannot be recovered until the initiating 
failure is remediated. 
 
4.4 Input data and calculations 
For the three fault tree examples, historical data and expert judgments by water utility 
personnel were used to define credibility densities (i.e. densities representing uncertainties) 
for the basic events [2]. Expert judgements were given as the 5th and 95th percentiles (P05 and 
P95). Data for all basic events in the examples are presented in Table 1 (see reference number 
next to each basic event in Figure 6). Variables λ and μ were modelled as exponential rates 
using Gamma distributions and variable q was modelled using a Beta distribution. 
For the approximate DFT calculations the generic equations (Section 3) were used to solve 
the fault trees and calculate the results at all levels, top and intermediate, in the fault tree. The 
calculations were performed using Monte Carlo simulations; one of the aims of this approach 
was to enable uncertainty analysis. The results of these simulations are compared to 
continuous time simulations of the corresponding Markov process representing the entire fault 
tree being modelled. For the Monte Carlo simulations 5,000 iterations were run and vales for 
the input variables are sampled from the densities in Table 1 and densities for the output 
results are generated. The Markov simulations are repeated the same number of times as the 
number of iterations in the Monte Carlo simulation. For each Markov simulation a set of input 
parameters is sampled from the credibility densities defined in Table 1, and the system is then 
run for at least 10,000 cycles (i.e. up- and downtimes) at the top level. The calculations and 
simulations were performed in the same way for all three examples, except for the specified 
number of up- and downtimes which differed due to varying computational demand. The 
number of cycles was, however, considered more than sufficient in all examples. 
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Figure 6 The three fault tree examples used to evaluate the approximate DFT calculations. The input data 
are presented in Table 1 and the values presented in the fault trees are the expected values. 
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Table 1 Input data for the basic events in the three fault tree examples. The mean value and the 5th and 95th 
percentiles (P05 and P95) are presented for the failure rate (λ), the repair rate (μ) and the 
probability of failure on demand (q). 
Mean P05 P95 Mean P05 P95 Mean P05 P95
1.1 Effects related to precipitation 20.5 16.9 24.4 153 127 182
1.2 Release of contaminats 7.5 5.4 9.9 161 116 212
1.3 Planned activities 14.5 11.5 17.8 708 562 867
1.4 Saltwater intrusion 17.3 14.0 20.8 504 408 607
1.5 Extraordinary events 0.070 0.005 0.200 12.1 3.0 26.1
1.6 Inlet pond unavailable 0.039 0.005 0.100 31.5 6.1 73.0
1.7 Collapse of tunnel 1 0.023 0.010 0.040 7.0 3.0 12.2
1.8 Siphon unavailable 0.011 0.005 0.020 4 918 52 17 520
1.9 Collapse of tunnel 2 0.013 0.005 0.025 7.0 3.0 12.2
1.10 Failure of pump station 0.029 0.020 0.040 1 427 183 3 650
1.11 Failure of pump station 0.134 0.050 0.250 13.0 4.1 26.1
1.12 Pipe failure 0.134 0.050 0.250 13.0 4.1 26.1
1.13 Failure of pipe from pump station 0.013 0.005 0.025 540 52 1 460
2.1 Quality deviation but no action 0.27 0.10 0.50 54.5 26.1 91.3
2.2 Treatment fails to compensate 6.20 3.19 10.03 2 701 1 035 3 914 0.095 0.050 0.150
2.3 Quality deviation not detected 0.24 0.17 0.33 178 52 365
2.4 Treatment fails to compensate 6.20 3.19 10.03 2 701 1 035 3 914 0.095 0.050 0.150
3.1 Failure of raw water inlet 0.02 0.01 0.04 60.1 18.3 121.7
3.2 Failure of process 1 1.89 0.50 4.00 1 069 730 1 460
3.3 Failure of process 2 0.27 0.10 0.50 597 365 876
3.4 Failure of process 3 1.89 0.50 4.00 1 152 876 1 460
3.5 Failure detected 0.97* 0.95* 0.98*
3.6 Decision to stop delivery 0.91* 0.85* 0.95*
3.7 Extraordinary event 0.003 0.001 0.005 15.7 3.0 36.5
3.8 WTP 1 fails to compensate 1603 1095 2190 0.011 0.005 0.020
3.9 WTP 2 fails to compensate 771 54 2204 0.011 0.005 0.020
3.10 Distribution fails to compensate 1663 876 2655 0.027 0.010 0.050
* The value represents the probability of failure since the event is not modelled using up- and downtimes.
Ref. Basic event
λ  [year-1] μ [year-1] q
 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Example 1 
The first fault tree example is characterised by only including traditional OR- and AND-gates 
(Figure 6). In Figure 7 the credibility (i.e. uncertainty) densities for the approximate DFT 
calculations and the Markov simulations are compared at the top level (gate E) for P(F), λ and 
μ respectively. The three pairs of credibility densities clearly show that the approximate 
calculations are consistent with the complete Markov simulations. Almost no differences can 
be seen when comparing the densities. 
To further evaluate the results, rejection rates were calculated showing the proportion of the 
values from the approximate DFT calculations that fall outside the 95 percent confidence 
interval of the Markov simulated values. The rejection rates for λ and μ are 0.053 and 0.051 
respectively. These rates are close to 0.05 and well within a 95 percent symmetric prediction 
interval based on the Central Limit Theorem for Binomial frequencies. The approximate 
calculations thus provide results that are in good agreement with the Markov simulations. 
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Figure 7 Credibility densities for the approximate dynamic fault tree (DFT) calculations and the complete 
Markov simulations for P(F), λ and μ respectively. 
 
The input data for the basic events are assumed to be Markovian failure (up) and repair (down) 
rates. The question is, however, if the up- and downtimes at the top event are exponential(λ) 
and exponential(μ) respectively. In Figure 8 two graphs are presented showing the up- and 
downtimes from the Markov simulations and the corresponding exponential distributions 
defined by the mean failure rate and repair rate values from the approximate DFT calculations. 
As can be seen from Figure 8, there is a good agreement for the uptime but the downtime is 
not exponential. 
 
 
Figure 8 Comparison to see if the up- and downtimes at the top event are exponentially distributed with rates 
λ and μ respectively. The up- and downtimes from the Markov simulations are plotted and 
compared to reference densities, based on the mean values from the approximate dynamic fault tree 
(DFT) calculations. 
 
5.2 Example 2 
The second fault tree example includes one traditional OR-gate and two second-variant AND-
gates (Figure 6). In Figure 9 the credibility densities for the approximate DFT calculations 
and the complete Markov simulations are presented at the top event (gate H) and compared 
for P(F), λ and μ respectively. As was the case also for the first example, almost no 
differences can be seen in the results from the approximate calculations and the Markov 
simulations. 
The rejection rates were calculated to 0.056 and 0.050 for λ and μ respectively. Both are 
within a 95 percent symmetric prediction interval based on the Central Limit Theorem for 
Binomial frequencies, thus confirming what is shown in the graphs in Figure 9. However, 
note that the rejection rate for λ is on the upper boundary of the interval. This may indicate 
that the error in the approximate DFT calculation of λ is detectable in large simulations. 
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Figure 9 Credibility densities for the approximate dynamic fault tree (DFT) calculations and the complete 
Markov simulations for P(F), λ and μ respectively. 
 
In Figure 10 the up- and downtimes are presented for the Markov simulations and a reference 
density based on the mean values from the approximate calculations. The graphs in Figure 10 
do not match perfectly, especially not for the downtime. Hence, the up- and downtimes cannot 
be assumed to be exponentially distributed. 
 
  
Figure 10 Comparison to see if the up- and downtimes at the top event are exponentially distributed with rates 
λ and μ respectively. The up- and downtimes from the Markov simulations are plotted and 
compared to reference densities, based on the mean values from the approximate dynamic fault tree 
(DFT) calculations. 
 
5.3 Example 3 
The third fault tree example includes traditional OR- and AND-gates but differs from the other 
examples since it includes also the first variant of the AND-gate (Figure 6). As shown in 
Figure 6 the fault tree includes three different events/components that may compensate for 
failure (events 3.8-3.10). It is concluded that the number of compensating events affects the 
error in the results. Therefore, this fault tree was simulated including only one compensating 
event (3.8), including two events (3.8 and 3.9) and including all three events. We refer to 
these three variants as example 3a, b and c respectively. The credibility densities (Figure 11) 
for the approximate DFT calculations and the Markov simulations are compared at the top 
level (gate E) for P(F), λ and μ respectively. The densities show that when one compensating 
event is included the results are in good agreement (Figure 10a-c), but when two, and in 
particular three, compensating events are included the errors increase (Figure 10d-f and g-i 
respectively).  
For all three variants of example 3 the probability of failure is underestimated and the rates λ 
and μ are overestimated using the approximate calculations. The mean probability of failure is 
underestimated by 4, 32 and 57 percent for examples 3a, b and c respectively. The mean 
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values for the rate λ are overestimated by 9, 18 and 27 percent respectively for the three cases. 
The largest errors occur in the rate μ where the approximate calculations give a mean value 
twice as big as the Markov simulations for example 3c. For examples 3a and b the rate μ is 
overestimated by 13 and 64 percent respectively. 
For example 3a the errors are small, especially when considering the uncertainties in the 
estimates caused by uncertainties in the input data. When two or three compensating events 
are included the errors are not negligible. However, considering the uncertainties in the input 
data the results give a reasonably good indication of the true value for the probability of 
failure and the failure rate. 
 
 
Figure 11 Credibility densities for the approximate dynamic fault tree (DFT) calculations and the complete 
Markov simulations for P(F), λ and μ respectively. Figures a-c represent the case when only one 
compensating event was included in the model, for d-f the model included two compensating events 
and for g-i all three events were included. 
 
As for examples 1 and 2 (Figures 8 and 10) the up- and downtimes for example 3 cannot be 
considered to be exponentially distributed. The results are similar for all three variants of 
example 3. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
When only traditional OR- and AND-gates were used, the approximate DFT calculations gave 
almost no errors in the results. For the second variant of the AND-gate, the results were also in 
very good agreement with the Markov simulations. For the first variant of the AND-gate only 
small errors were observed when one compensating event/component was included. However, 
when two or three compensating events were included, the errors were not negligible. Hence, 
the number of compensating events should be kept to a minimum to not cause severe errors in 
the results. 
One of the ideas with the approximate calculation was to enable uncertainty analysis by 
performing Monte Carlo simulations. Considering the uncertainties in the input data for the 
examples presented here, and the application by Lindhe et al. [2], the errors in the results can 
be accepted. The entire fault tree used by Lindhe et al. [2] includes fifteen second-variant 
AND-gates and of the first variant there are three with one compensating event, two with two 
compensating events and two with three compensating events. The first variant AND-gates are 
all placed at a high level in the fault tree and a sensitivity analysis presented by Lindhe [20] 
showed that the input parameters to these gates are not the ones contributing most to the 
uncertainties in the results at the top level. The errors in the results are considered acceptable 
when compared to the uncertainties in the results caused by uncertainties in the input 
parameters. 
To correctly model a system it may be necessary to include more than one compensating 
event/component in a first variant AND-gate. In such cases, the fault tree model should be 
structured to correctly represent the analysed system but uncertainty analysis should be 
performed to determine what basic events contribute most to the uncertainties in the results. If 
the events representing the compensating components have a relatively small effect on the 
uncertainties in the results, the model can be used. However, to handle situations where the 
effect is significant, several compensating events could, if possible, be described as one event. 
Another solution is to model this small part of the fault tree using Markov simulations and use 
the results as input to the approximate DFT calculations. It is a future task to provide a proper 
way to combine several compensating events into one that can be used as input in a fault tree 
model. 
As shown in all three examples, the up- and downtimes are not exponential(λ) and 
exponential(μ) respectively. Consequently, the calculated rates cannot be used to calculate the 
probability of, for example, failure during a specific time period. However, the possibility to 
estimate not only the probability of failure, but also the failure rate and the mean downtime at 
each intermediate level provides valuable information on the system’s dynamic behaviour. 
Two subsystems may have the same probability of failure but different failure rates and 
downtimes. Properties like these are important to know about when analysing a system and 
evaluating risk-reduction measures. 
To understand the function of system, it is important to not only study the top event in the 
fault tree but also the intermediate events. When a fault tree model is constructed, information 
on intermediate events also simplifies model evaluation. An additional reason for using up- 
and downtimes, or the corresponding rates λ and μ, is that it is often easier to estimate these 
parameters instead of directly estimating the probability of an event. Information on 
component failure and other events in drinking water systems is often available in the form of 
rates or times. Also the elicitation of expert judgements may be easier if rates and times are 
used instead of probabilities. 
Compared to complete Markov simulations the approximate DFT calculations make the 
model building easier and reduce the computational burden remarkably. This is especially true 
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for extensive fault tree models. Software for performing Monte Carlo simulations is required 
but the fault tree model and the calculations can be built and performed using common 
spreadsheet software. 
The variants of the AND-gate make it possible to consider the inherent ability of a system to 
compensate for failure. Hence, drinking water systems can be modelled in a correct manner 
that in most cases is not possible if only traditional OR- and AND-gates are used. The 
application of approximate DFT calculations in the case studies presented by Lindhe et al. [2, 
3] and Rosén et al. [19] showed that the calculations facilitate the work of modelling water 
supply risks and evaluating the effect of risk-reduction measures. Compared to traditional 
fault tree calculations the dynamic calculations provide additional and useful information 
when analysing drinking water systems. Information on up- and downtimes at all levels in the 
fault tree facilitates system evaluation. The approximate DFT calculations have been applied 
to model water supply risks but they are most likely also applicable and useful in other fields. 
The main conclusions of this paper are: 
- For the traditional OR- and AND-gates, and the second variant of the AND-gate, there are 
only very small errors in the results of the approximate DFT calculations. 
- For the first variant of the AND-gate the errors in the DFT results increase with the number 
of compensating events/components included. Hence, the number of compensating events 
modelled using the first variant AND-gate should be kept to a minimum, preferably only 
one. When several compensating events are needed to model a system correctly, 
uncertainty analysis should be performed to see how the events affect the results. 
- By combining the approximate DFT calculations with Monte Carlo simulations, 
uncertainty analysis is enabled. It is shown that the errors in the approximate calculations 
are in most cases small and acceptable when considering uncertainties in input data and 
results. 
- The approximate DFT calculations facilitate simple model building and calculations that 
are less computationally demanding than Markov simulations. 
- When a system is analysed it is not only the results at the top level that should be 
evaluated. Information on failure probabilities, failure rates (or uptimes) and mean 
downtimes at all levels in the fault tree are important in the evaluation of the system. 
The work has shown that approximate DFT calculations in combination with Monte Carlo 
simulations provides a practically applicable technique for analysing risks to drinking water 
systems, including modelling and evaluation of risk-reduction measures. The variants of the 
common type AND-gate make it possible to model entire drinking water systems, from source 
to tap, in a correct way. 
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